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The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in late 1992 been variously explained as a 
product of defective federal institutions, the competitive incentives of new party 
systems, varied national responses to economic reform, and divergent political 
cultures. Gil Eyal’s book brings a fresh perspective, identifying the counter-elites that 
developed in Czechoslovakia during the late communist period and subsequently 
came to power in 1989, as the key to the federation’s demise. Such new elites, Eyal 
argues, are best understood in sociological terms as factions of the rising ‘new class’ 
of intellectuals and technocrats first identified ‘on the road to class power’ in Eastern 
Europe in the 1970s by Szelényi and Konrad. 
While the new Czech political elite was formed of ex-dissident anti-politicians and 
neo-liberal technocrats from the ‘grey zone’ between the opposition and the 
communist regime, Slovakia’s post-1989 political class was composed of communist-
era managers, technocrats with a reform communist background and co-opted 
nationalist intellectuals. Unlike their isolated Czech counterparts, Slovak counter-
elites were, moreover, closely inter-linked and partially integrated with both society 
and communist power structures. As such, they resembled a traditional ‘upper class’. 
The origins of Czech-Slovak elite divergence, Eyal suggests, lie in contrasting 
reactions to the collapse of the Prague Spring in 1968 and to the subsequent purges of 
reformists during the ‘normalisation’ period.  
Eyal examines Czech and Slovak  counter–elites’ contrasting claims to power and 
authority, which following Pierre Bourdieu, he sees as mutable and convertible. In the 
Czech case, both and after before 1989, Eyal claims, both dissidents and monetarist 
economists claimed what Foucault termed  ‘pastoral power’, seeing themselves as 
confessors and civic educators for a citizenry morally corrupted by communism. 
Despite ostensible political differences, Eyal suggests, the two groups’ underlying 
moralism and anti-communism drew them towards common ‘right-wing’ policies 
whose essence was ritual renunciation of the communist past. While the dissidents 
stressed personal integrity and the creation of a authentic social sphere, neo-liberals 
saw the free market as a natural and morally beneficial order. In Slovakia, by contrast, 
the emergent ‘upper class’ saw themselves as rooted in a world of social and national 
interests. They thus interpreted the communist era as part of a shared national past, 
which could not (and should not) be not rejected at the behest of Prague. In ‘remaking 
the political field’ in such different ways, the two emergent national elites paved the 
way for party-political polarisation and the break-up of the federal state. However, 
Eyal stresses, this was above all the result of the way elites chose to construct their 
identities and understandings of politics, not of fixed legacies. 
Eyal’s central insight – that post-communist elites derived from the counter-elites 
groupings that emerged after 1968 in response to the failure of reform communism - 
is compelling. He is also original in stressing that such elites were diverse and 
extended beyond better known groups such as Charter 77 or deposed reform 
communist leaders. His stress on the ways such groups consciously remade their own 
identities and definitions of politics is plausible and a useful corrective to the 
prevalent structuralism in much comparative analysis. However, the book’s ambition 
outstrips its author’s ability to develop his insights effectively. Firstly, the depth of 
research and range of sources consulted (heavily biased towards English language 
material) seem inadequate to explore the complexity of phenomena such 
Czechoslovak dissent and the ‘grey zone’. Secondly, his narrow focus on actors’ 
conceptions of power effectively excludes meaningful consideration of institutions, 
social and political interests, ideology or indeed concrete issues of transformation. 
Much of the resultant analysis is thus unconvincing or tendentious. Eyal is, for 
example, right to see the appeal of the market (for neo-liberals) and civil society (for 
dissidents) as rooted in a common desire to replace bureaucratic state power with 
decentralised, autonomous social systems. However, the notion of a Czech dissident-
technocrat ‘alliance’, even a short-lived one in 1990-92, is misleading.  Almost no 
dissidents, including those of a right-wing persuasion, joined Klaus’s Civic 
Democratic Party, the main vehicle for the neo-liberal technocratic elite. Viewed 
critically, the supposed ‘alliance’ amounted only to the fact that both groups were 
propelled to power by the Velvet Revolution and shared a commitment to democracy, 
the market and a pro-Western orientation. This is hardly a ‘coherent ideological 
strategy’ (p. 160). Neither did it distinguish them, as Eyal supposes, from ex-reform 
communists, whom he claims – largely on the basis of a reading of 1980s samizdat 
debates on the ‘transfer’ of the Sudeten Germans - had distinct conceptions of politics 
and power, which made them rivals and even were ‘enemies’ (p. 62). Many ex-reform 
communists were later Charter 77 signatories. Some became social liberals or 
conservatives. Non-socialist dissent always contained a range of views not reducible 
to the composite ‘anti-political’ position sketched here. Moreover, much anti-political 
thinking simply reflected the impossibility of political action or was abandoned by 
many dissidents by the late 1980s as repression moderated. Eyal also underestimates 
and misinterprets Czech neo-liberals and their ‘need’ for an alliance with dissidents. 
Genuine technical competence coupled with deep-rooted Czech and Slovak respect 
for the ‘expert’ (odborník)– both later developed by Klaus’s party into a broader 
ideology of political professionalism– was legitimacy enough. Eyal’s claim of a 
shared neo-liberal and ex-dissident vision to marketisation and decommunisation as 
acts of civic education and ritual purification is similarly unconvincing. Despite 
paying lip service to the need for cultural change, the Czech Right’s underlying view 
was always that the good sense of Czechs had survived communism intact. 
Institutional change, which would change behaviour by changing incentives would 
therefore suffice. As Kieran Williams’ research has demonstrated, lustration was, in 
fact, a response to concerns about threats to democracy from ‘old structures’ and an 
attempt to tame grassroots Czech anti-communism through legality and due process. 
Finally, the contrast between Czech and Slovak elites is perhaps overstated. As in 
Slovakia, communist-era economic managers in the Czech Republic were an 
important part of the new power elite.  Czech dissident historians, like their Slovak 
equivalents, focused on the nation, not merely reassessing of relations with the 
Sudeten Germans. Correspondingly, although Slovakia had few dissidents in the 
Czech sense, it possessed a significant (if isolated) liberal counter-elite in ‘islands of 
positive deviance’ that formed within many official organisations in the late 1980s.  
The Origins of Postcommunist Elites offers a perplexing combination of compelling, 
original insight and contrived and unconvincing case analysis. It is, nevertheless, an 
intellectually significant book, whose claim to address wider questions of power 
should be taken seriously. As such, it merits a wide, but critical, readership. 
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